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Abstract: The aim of the article is to present the finances of Daesh, from making 
the biggest profits from natural resources, taxation and extortion through other 
illegal activities related to the kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking, the 
sale of looted antiques and artifacts, to the enrichment of the financial resources 
with foreign donations, taking control over banks, currency arbitrage exchange 
rates or collecting money using modern social networks. Worth noting is the 
traditional way of transferring money by terrorists using the hawala system and 
modern transfers related to the use of cryptocurrency (for example Bitcoin) and 
prepaid cards. The continuous decrease of the areas controlled by Daesh and 
the loss of its population, undoubtedly has a negative impact on its further func-
tioning, thereby significantly undermining the diversification of income. How-
ever, gradual stop in territorial expansion may, but doesn’t have to indicate the 
breakdown of the existing entity. 
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Abstrakt: Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie źródeł pozyskiwania funduszy 
przez Daesh, począwszy od czerpania największych zysków z surowców natu-
ralnych, podatków i wymuszeń, przez inne, nielegalne procedery związane z po-
rwaniami dla okupu, handlem ludźmi, sprzedażą zrabowanych antyków, aż po 
wzbogacanie bazy finansowej zagranicznymi dotacjami, przejęciem banków, ar-
bitrażem walutowym czy gromadzeniem pieniędzy za pomocą sieci społeczno-
ściowych. Warto zwrócić uwagę na tradycyjny sposób przesyłania pieniędzy 
przez terrorystów za pomocą systemu hawala oraz nowoczesnych transferów 
związanych z wykorzystaniem kryptowalut (np. Bitcoin) oraz kart prepaid. Cią-
głe zmniejszanie się terenów kontrolowanych przez Daesh oraz utrata populacji 
niewątpliwie wpływa negatywnie na ich dalsze funkcjonowanie, a tym samym 
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znacznie osłabia dywersyfikację dochodów. Jednak stopniowe zatrzymywanie 
ekspansji terytorialnej może, lecz nie musi, wskazywać na rozpad istniejącego 
tworu.  
Słowa kluczowe: Daesh, finanse, Irak, Państwo Islamskie, Syria, terroryzm  
 
 
Introduction  
 
Daesh1, often appearing under the names: Islamic State (IS), 
the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) or the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Levant (ISIL) is a modern form of terrorist activity, which 
combines elements of a terrorist organization, criminal group, state 
and armed formation. Researchers of this “phenomenon” has so far 
not met with the terrorist structure, which has, on the one hand, 
hard power based on thousands of fighters and a large amount of 
military equipment, on the other hand, soft power, centered primar-
ily in the institutions of the administrative nature, a kind of minis-
tries (divans). They function in parastate and relate, inter alia, to 
matters connected with propaganda, recruitment, logistics or fi-
nance. Daesh funds were estimated in 2016 on a powerful amount 
of 2-3 billion dollars. Compared to the other selected terrorist groups 
they look as follows: Hezbollah $200-500 million, Hamas about 
$70 million and Al-Qaeda $15-50 million2. 
 A distinctive feature of Daesh is that it operates on the terri-
tory of more than one state. It rejects any international plans for a 
new order. The co-called Caliphate was officially proclaimed on June 
29, 2014 by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It controls the areas of Iraq – 
ancient Mesopotamia and Syria (aspiring to cover the historical out-
line taking into account Jordan, Lebanon and Israel). Subsequently, 
in terms of both propaganda and symbolic dimension it will strive 
                                                          
1 The acronym formed from the initial letters of the Arabic name Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria, hated by its members due to the very similar, pejorative sound of the word “daes” 
meaning  “crush” or “broken”. In view of not glorifying that entity, the author in the text 
will use the abbreviation “Daesh”. 
2 J. Raubo, Ekspert: Państwo Islamskie to hybrydowa struktura terrorystyczna, 
http://www.defence24.pl/564221,ekspert-panstwo-islamskie-to-hybrydowa-struktura-
terrorystyczna-wywiad (access: 16.07.2017). 
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for supremacy over the Middle East and North Africa, and in the fu-
ture, the areas inhabited (in the present and the past) by Muslims3. 
Initially, each month the terrorists from Daesh conquered new terri-
tories, and leaders of many other jihadist groups swore an oath of 
fidelity to the Caliph. Three years later the situation changed to their 
disadvantage, because they have lost 60% of the controlled area, it 
decreased from 90.8 thousand km² to 36.2 thousand km²4. 
 Forecasts from September 2014, indicated that Daesh had 
very large funds. Compared to other terrorist organizations, it was 
number one in the world. Daily income oscillated within $3 million, 
resulting in an annual equivalent of $ 1.3-2 billion. During this time, 
it earned more than small states. Collected money played and still 
plays a major role in the functioning of this creation. These funds 
help to i.a.: provide remuneration for fighters, provide and maintain 
military equipment, help to corrupt tribal leaders, manage the infra-
structure and administration as well as develop media propa-
ganda5. It is difficult to indicate the appropriate sums obtained by 
the Daesh for any type of business (due to the diversification of the 
sources of fundraising), more often these are estimates. The terro-
rists derive the greatest profit from the natural resources, in parti-
cular oil and natural gas, as well as taxes and extortion and other 
sources bringing relatively less income. As evidenced by the report 
presented by IHS Markit revenue of this terrorist organization dras-
tically decreased, by 80% taking into account second quarter of 2015 
and 2017, from $ 81 million per month to $ 16 million per month 
(Figure 1).  
  
 
  
                                                          
3 K. Strachota, Bliski Wschód w cieniu Państwa Islamskiego, „Punkt widzenia OSW”, 2015,  
No. 52, p. 15,   https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_52_pl_bliski-wschod-w-
cieniu_net.pdf (access: 16.07.2017). 
4 Islamic State territory down 60% and revenue down 80% on Caliphate’s third anniversary, 
Report IHS Markit, 29.06.2017, http://blog.ihs.com/islamic-state-territory-down-60-
percent-and-revenue-down-80-percent-on-caliphates-third-
anniversary?ito=832&itq=4db1f595-c576-4717-b456-2efe57ec41b5&itx[idio]=8414618 
(access: 16.07.2017). 
5 M. Levitt, Terrorist Financing and Islamic State, The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, November 13, 2014, pp. 2-3. 
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Source: Islamic State territory down 60% and revenue down 80% on Caliphate’s third  
anniversary, Report IHS Markit, June 29, 2017, http://blog.ihs.com/islamic-state-territory-
down-60-percent-and-revenue-down-80-percent-on-caliphates-third-anniver-
sary?ito=832&itq=4db1f595-c576-4717-b456-2efe57ec41b5&itx[idio]=8414618  
(access: 16.07.2017). 
 
Figure 1. Daesh’s monthly revenue 
 
Main sources of revenue 
 
 Petroleum. Daesh draws its funds from natural resources. By 
the end of 2014, its main revenue was oil and related products sold 
to internal customers living in areas controlled by Daesh and third 
parties (i.a. Syrian Government, criminal elements in Turkey)6.  
Before the start of the air strikes of the global coalition under the 
leadership of the United States in August 2014, this terrorist organ-
ization extracted about 80 thousand barrels of oil per day. A barrel 
of oil on the so-called black market was around $ 40 (half of the 
regular price). It is believed that Daesh sold 50 thousand barrels per 
                                                          
6 A. Shostak, Striking at their Core – De-funding the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, “Journal 
of Terrorism Research” 2017, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 44.  
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day to Syria and 30 thousand to Iraq7. From time to time it trans-
ported oil to neighboring countries, to meet the needs of the occupied 
territories. Despite the earlier significant growth, between August 
and November 2014, their daily extraction of oil has dropped from 
80 to 20 thousand. In addition, it is estimated that in the period be-
tween October 2014 and April 2015 the income from petroleum and 
its products decreased by 80%. The reason for such state were the 
air strikes of the international coalition against Daesh, on oil refin-
eries, as well as the fall in oil prices on the world market8. 
 For smuggling the petroleum Daesh used illegal routes, which 
appeared in the 1990s, and during the reign of Saddam Hussein, 
created as part of the “Oil-for-food” program. Oil was transported out 
of the conflict zone using the fuel tanks, trucks, containers carried 
on mules, makeshift tubes and rafts needed for crossing the rivers. 
Turkish authorities located underground pipeline in length of almost 
5 km. Daesh used a specialized Iraqi workforce. Often, thanks to 
their work, oil fields prospered properly (e.g. in Qayara)9. Daesh sold 
oil to  Jordan and Turkey (20-100 dollars a barrel)10. Ankara said 
that in the first eight months of 2014 Daesh took over 20 million 
liters of oil on the southern borders of Turkey11. 
An important role has been played by province Deir ez-Zor 
(largest petroleum area in Syria) and Raqqa (the area where Daesh 
controls several oil fields), controlled from 2014. No doubt the loss of 
Mosul in July 2017, as well as the destruction in June 2016, of the 
ISIS’s oil ministry headquarters and the death of the ISIS’s oil min-
ister negatively affected raising new funds. Global coalition air 
strikes were aimed at leveling the infrastructure and equipment 
needed to produce oil. Therefore, holding in particular Raqqa can 
help to maintain the credibility of this organization and Deir ez-Zor 
to diversify sources of fundraising12. However, according to the latest 
                                                          
7 M. Levitt, op. cit., p. 3. 
8 A. Shostak, op. cit.,  p. 44.  
9 M. Levitt, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
10 J. Hansen-Lewis, J. N. Shapiro, Understanding the Daesh Economy, “Perspectives on 
Terrorism”, 2015, Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 144. 
11 M. Levitt, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
12 R. Kreisman, Raqqa and the Oil Economy of ISIS, Atlantic Council, May 15, 2017, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/raqqa-and-the-oil-economy-of-isis 
(access: 17.07.2017). 
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reports the troops of Syrian Arab Army are getting closer to the two 
muhafazahs surrounding jihadists from the Eastern Province of 
Hama and Homs. In addition, Bashar al-Assad’s army in June 
2017 recaptured an oil fields lying south of al-Resafar, and in July 
16th of the same year, with the support of the Russian air forces, 
recaptured an oil fields in the southwestern part of Raqqa gover-
norate13.  
Natural gas. Another natural resource that Daesh benefits 
from is natural gas. Its largest deposits are located in the of Al-Anbar 
governorate, seized in 201414, smaller in the central region between 
the towns of Homs and Palmira15. Gas service (often used for elec-
tricity production) is more complicated than oil, hence requires 
greater involvement in production. At the end of May 2015, Daesh 
has gained control of the oil fields in Palmyra. The region was rich in 
less than half of the total natural gas production in Syria. Therefore, 
the organization was able to “accept” the loss of Tikrit at the end of 
March 2015. The revenue from natural gas decreased by 30%, from 
nearly $ 490 million to $ 350 million. In addition, the air strikes car-
ried out in Deir ez-Zor province contributed to the reduction of the 
qualified personnel and income. Recapture of Palmyra by the Syrian 
army lowered their profits by 60 million dollars16. 
 Daesh is described by the media as the richest terrorist group 
in the world, with growing wealth of oil, what was true in the early 
stages of the so-called caliphate proclamation17. Later the situation 
has changed. The researchers found that oil revenue peak has been 
achieved in the end of 2014. Therefore, next years have forced Daesh 
to seek funds from other sources. As indicated by the IHS Markit, 
                                                          
13 Sukcesy armii syryjskiej w prowincji Ar-Rakka, Defence24, July 16, 2017, 
http://www.defence24.pl/static_cache/d/630019,sukcesy-armii-syryjskiej-w-prowincji-
ar-rakka.html (access: 17.07.2017). 
14 J.C. Brisard, D. Martinez, Islamic State: The Economy-Based Terrorist Funding, 
“Thomson Reuters”, October 2014, p. 7. 
15 D. Stergiou, ISIS political economy: financing a terror state, “Journal of Money 
Laundering Control” 2016, Vol. 19, No. 2, p. 194. 
16 L. Bindner, G. Poirot, ISIS Financing in 2015. Report, Center for the Analysis of 
Terrorism, May 2016, http://cat-int.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ISIS-Financing-
2015-Report.pdf, pp. 11-12 (access: 17.07.2017). 
17 L. Hayward, Oil, Money, and Terror: Interview with Thomas Sanderson of CSIS, “The 
Fuse”, May 23, 2016, http://energyfuse.org/oil-money-terror-interview-thomas-m-
sanderson-csis/ (access: 17.07.2017). 
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between April 2015 and June 2017, the revenue generated from the 
extraction and sale of oil and gas fell by 88%. In the second quarter 
of 2015 it earned $33 million per month, and two years later, only 
$4 million. In 2016, respectively in the first and third quarter earn-
ings were $56 and $31 million per month (Figure 1). 
 Taxation and confiscation. Currently the most profitable 
source of income of Daesh is taxes (zakat) and seizures. They are the 
biggest financial resources of this group, replacing ipso facto oil and 
natural gas. Daesh in order to obtain civil and administrative control 
over the acquired area of Syria and Iraq has introduced taxes on 
goods such as oil, medicines and other products; telecommunica-
tions companies; cash withdrawals from bank accounts; social ben-
efits (5%) and on looting archeological sites. In addition, it imposed 
road taxes ($200 in northern Iraq); customs taxes ($800 fee payable 
at checkpoints for cars entering Iraq from Jordan and Syria); safety 
taxes levied on non-Muslim population (jizya). The annual income 
from this source can generate up to 360 million dollars18. For exam-
ple, in the Syrian muhafazah Deir ez-Zor in wilayat al-Kheir in the 
month of Rabi ' al-Awal in year 1436 AH were as follows: zakat from 
the wheat $300 thousand; barley $170 thousand; property $1.2 mil-
lion; camels $206 thousand and fruits $ 100 thousand19.  
 Earlier vast earnings were brought by Mosul, currently 
Raqqa. Christians living in this city, to avoid expulsion had to pay 
“protection insurance” or “tribute”. Daesh also collects taxes on 
banks, real estate and business activities. Starting from the second 
quarter of 2016, it collects the taxes in the following proportions:  
2% on sale, 5% on withdrawal from the bank, 10% on inhabitants 
and 15% on companies. For not knowing the Quran it imposes  
“religious fines”. It also obliges the population living in controlled ar-
eas to pay taxes for safety and energy20 ($1.25 per month) and water 
($2.5 per month)21. In addition, it carries out various types of sei-
zures, among which are i.a. refugees’ houses or cars, then sold  
                                                          
18 J.C. Brisard, D. Martinez, op. cit., p. 5. 
19 A.J. Al-Tamimi, The Archivist: Unseen Islamic State Financial Accounts for Deir az-Zor 
Province, “Jihadology” October 5, 2015, http://www.aymennjawad.org/ 17916/the-
archivist-unseen-islamic-state-financial (access: 17.07.2017). 
20 R. Kreisman, op. cit.  
21 L. Bindner and G. Poirot, op. cit., p. 16. 
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in local markets. The table below shows the monthly income from 
confiscation in the Deir ez-Zor governorate based on a document  
issued by Daesh. 
 
Table 1. Table of confiscations for the month of Rabi’ al-Awal of the year 1436 AH 
(December 2014/January 2015) 
 
Wilayat 
al-Kheir  
Albukamal  Al-
Mayadeen 
Al-Badiya  Borders  Tajammu’at 
House   6 17 56 
Car  3 2  80 11 
Truck 1  11 36  
Material 
sums  
$2000 $1300 $13,000 $480,000  
Land  
(in dunams) 
   
180 
dunams 
20 
Forbidden 
items  
 
Cigarettes: 
3000 
packs 
100 cases 
of cigarettes 
1200 cases 
of cigarettes 
 
Livestock  93  
600 head 
of sheep 
1320 head 
of sheep, 
50 cows 
 
 
Source: A. J. Al-Tamimi, The Archivist: Unseen Islamic State Financial Accounts for Deir az-Zor 
Province, “Jihadology”, October 5, 2015, http://www.aymennjawad.org/17916/ 
the-archivist-unseen-islamic-state-financial (access: 17.07.2017). 
 
 After taking control of the Mosul, in 2014 Daesh has gained 
from $300 to 400 million from taxes and confiscation. In 2015, the 
level of revenue increased by $400-800. A year later, due to the loss 
of the major transit points in Syria such as Jarabulus, decreased to 
$200-400 million22. Loss of key city in Iraq in mid-2017, has con-
tributed to a drastic reduction in income compared to the second 
quarter of 2015 and 2017, from $39 million to $8 million, represent-
ing a decrease of 79% (Figure 1).  
Agriculture. Taxes also apply to agriculture. Zakat in the 
amount of 5% is put on the irrigated crops and of 10% on the rainfed 
                                                          
22 S. Heißner, P.R. Neumann, J. Holland-McCowan, R. Basra, Caliphate in Decline: An 
Estimate of Islamic State’s Financial Fortunes, “The International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation” 2017: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-
Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-Fortunes.pdf, p. 7 (access: 
17.07.2017). 
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crops. The most important and profitable crops are wheat and bar-
ley, which in the Deir ez-Zor governorate constitute 60% of the 
monthly income, next are camels 25% and fruits 13%. In a period of 
one month (from the end of December 2015 to the end of January 
2016) tax on agriculture accounted for 10% of the total income. 
Daesh trades grain on their own account and uses the warehouses 
to store the goods, when the prices are not high. Furthermore, their 
taxes also include cattle and cotton. Food prices are much higher in 
so-called caliphate than in other areas. In Baghdad, the price of food 
was 25-40% lower than in Anbar. Price differences of wheat flour and 
sugar were significant. Dietary diversity decreased due to difficulties 
in access to dairy products, meat and vegetables23. 
 
Other sources of revenue 
 
 Kidnapping for ransom. Daesh has committed hundreds of 
kidnappings of Iraqis and Syrians, from the region of East Asia, as 
well as the inhabitants of the West. For some victims it received the 
ransom, while others have been brutally murdered. According to the 
FATF in 2014 Daesh, earned from $20 to 45 million. However, it is 
difficult to make accurate estimates due to the fact that payments 
often come from private companies that have tried to hide the tran-
sactions paying in cash. Hence, there is a difficulty to identify the 
transaction24. Kidnappings can have purely propagandist charac-
ter. An example is James Foley. Daesh required $132,5 billion ran-
som for the release of American journalist25. For other kidnappings 
much smaller amounts were demanded. The lack of accurate and 
reliable data for 2015, makes it difficult to present funds obtained 
from this source. Probably in comparison with the previous year 
earnings were much lower. Group in 2016, in total received funds 
                                                          
23 H.H. Jaafar, E. Woertz, Agriculture as a funding source of ISIS: A GIS and remotesensing 
analysis, “Food Policy” September 14, 2016, p. 16. 
24 Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), 
Financial Action Task Force Report, February 2015, p. 18. 
25 S. Frenkel, How ISIS Became The Richest Terrorist Group In The World, “BuzzFed 
News”, August 28, 2014, https://www.buzzfeed.com/sheerafrenkel/how-did-isis-
become-the-richest-terrorist-group-in-the-world?utm_term=.tergGkYmv#.hbpq4P3jM 
(access: 18.07.2017). 
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from $10 to 30 million, i.a. due to the kidnappings of local inhabit-
ants, including more than 200 Assyrian Christians released in the 
same year26. Forecast from 2017, significantly reduce the profits from 
this practice. Human trafficking. Practice of human trafficking is  
another method of Daesh’s revenue collection. By this practice it  
increases workforce, creates military and informative units, en-
slaves and sexually abuses. Women and children are sold on black 
market, and the profits provide high incomes for criminal groups27. 
Daesh rejects all different forms of ethnic and religious minorities.  
In their orthodox creation – “caliphate” Sunni are at the highest place. 
Shiites, Yazidis and Alawis should be completely eliminated, while, 
other non-Muslim communities (largely Christians) are forced to be 
a slaves. Captured in 2014, in Mosul, women and girls (in particular 
Christian and Yazidi) have been repeatedly beaten and raped28, or 
sold on the “slave auctions” as future sexual concubines. Price for 
abducted women were not exorbitant, even very low (approx. $13)29. 
In general, this type of acquiring financial sources does not bring a 
lot of income. 
Antiques trafficking. Daesh in its propaganda message de-
stroys works of all kinds of art objects located on the territory of Iraq 
and Syria. Some of them were actually devastated for the need of 
media images, showing the members of Daesh as the destroyers, 
presented as experts of Arab and Islamic culture. Cooperating media 
are designed to promote the international brand of terrorism. Shock-
ing materials confirm that terrorists will not stop. They will not stop 
destroying priceless works of art. In order to obtain further funds it 
craftily smuggles and sells antiques on the black market. The im-
portant matter is that these items should be authentic and not very 
recognizable. To sell the work of art it must be exported from the 
occupied areas to countries such as Lebanon or Turkey, which have 
                                                          
26 S. Heißner et al., op. cit., p. 8. 
27 A. Prokić, The Link Between Organized Crime and Terrorism, “Law and Politics” 2017, 
Vol. 15, No 1, pp. 92-93. 
28 A. Ahram, Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS, “Survival” 2015, Vol. 57, No. 3,  
pp. 66-67.  
29 Financial Action Task Force Report..., op. cit., p. 13. 
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access to the works of art markets30. In addition, Daesh makes  
profits from charging for a permit to search for valuable artifacts31.  
The total income derived from this source is difficult to estimate,  
because these practices are widespread throughout Syria, not only 
in areas controlled by Daesh. According to estimates of the National 
Geographic report Daesh and other illegal groups can earn tens of 
millions on monuments stolen in Syria32. 
 Foreign donations. The money obtained from the foreign do-
nors is not significant in comparison to other sources. It is estimated 
that Daesh obtains not more than 5% of the revenue from donations. 
Received contributions mainly come from Gulf countries, ie. Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar33 and Kuwait34. On the one hand, there is concern that 
the foreign support may increase with the loss of income from other 
sources. On the other hand, groups such as the Filipino Abu Sayyaf 
and Egyptian Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis that declared their loyalty to 
Daesh may strengthen the organizational bonds by providing their 
funds35. 
 Takeovers of banks and currency arbitrage. Daesh homogene-
ous drives led to the seizure of the financial sector. After the capture 
of Mosul group has won control of several branches of private and 
public banks, including a branch of the Central Bank of Iraq.  
Muhafazah Nineveh announced that in June 2014, this terrorist  
organization has stolen $425 million and partially took control of 
Syria’s banking system in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor governorates. Sup-
posedly the People’s Credit Bank in Raqqa is used to collect taxes on 
water or electricity in the amount of $20 per month from each cus-
tomer36. Currently, Daesh has lost access to state banks in Northern 
                                                          
30 M. Raggi, How ISIS created a terrorist art market, FOX News, April 17, 2015, 
http://www.foxnews.com/science/2015/04/16/isis-terrorist-art-market.html (access: 
18.07.2017). 
31 S. Heißner et al., op. cit., p. 8. 
32 Financial Action Task Force Report..., op. cit., pp. 16-17. 
33 J.R. Flores Jr., Funding Terror: An Analysis of Financing Methods for Terror Groups 
Based in the Middle East, “Business Liberty University”, April 10-11, 2015, p. 3. 
34 C.P. Clarke, K. Jackson, P. B. Johnston, E. Robinson, H. J. Shatz, Financial Futures of 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, RAND Corporation, 2017, p. 9. 
35 Financial Action Task Force Report..., op. cit., p. 18-19. 
36 J.C. Brisard and D. Martinez, Islamic State: The Economy-Based Terrorist Funding, 
Thomson Reuters, October 2014, p. 6. 
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and Western Iraq that provided at least $500 million per year. In ad-
dition, by using the arbitrage exchange rates, which is indirect par-
ticipation in domestic and bank stock markets, it bought (on the 
Iraqi bank currency auctions) dollars below the market rate and later 
resold at market prices, enriching its financial background37. 
 In the journal “Dabiq”, published by Al-Hayat Media Centre 
Daesh announced the issuance of its own currency, 1 dinar  
(4.25 g of gold), 5 and 10 dirhams (10 g and 20 g of gold) and  
20 fulus (20 g of copper). Individual coins show: 
 7 ears indicating in the Quran charity of alms for Allah and 
the Muslim community; 
 Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem reminds about Muhammad’s 
travel to the Holy City of Jerusalem, a reference to the end of 
time and the return of the Mahdi; 
 White minaret in Damascus, place of the return of Jesus, who 
will face the armies of the Antichrist at the end of the world 
on the grounds of Al-Sham; 
 spear and shield, according to Hadith providing durability 
and prosperity of the population;  
 3 palm trees – blessed trees symbolizing paradise and 
reminding oasis in Medina38.  
 Funds from the modern communication networks. Daesh ena-
bles the collection of revenue by using modern communication net-
works. With the help of media, periodicals, magazines, journals  
(e.g. the Arabic “Al-Naba”, English “Rumyiah”, Turkish “Konstan-
tiniyye”, Russian “Istok”, French “Dar al-Islam”), social networks  
(eg. Twitter, Facebook) invites to deposit donations – “...if you cannot 
fight you can give money”. Al-Awlaki in his speech urged people  
(especially from the West) to participate in the jihad and supporting 
those militants who need help39. Propaganda using hashtags below 
                                                          
37 C.P. Clarke et al., op. cit., p. 9. 
38 O. Hanne, F. de la Neuville, Państwo Islamskie. Geneza nowego kalifatu, Warszawa 
2015, pp. 161-163. 
39 Daesh Recruitment. How the Group Attracts Supporters, NATO Strategic 
Communications Centre of Exelence, November 2016, http://www.stratcomcoe.org/ 
daesh-recruitment-how-group-attracts-supporters-0, pp. 13-14 (access 18.07.2017). 
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the most popular tweets increases the range of provided infor-
mation40. The use of government benefits by Muslims living in West-
ern countries is also recommended. The report published on behalf 
of the Swedish equivalent of Financial Supervision Commission  
Finansinspektionen, the Scandinavian social welfare system was 
used to support Daesh militants. Between 2013-2016 from Sweden 
to Syria or Iraq emigrated more than 300 people who have received 
social benefits from the state. In this way, the Islamic radicals have 
enriched this organization with hundreds of thousands of euros. 
People fighting in the ranks of Daesh extorted benefits using other 
people, impersonating their identity. Then send money via interna-
tional transfers to jihadists’ army41. 
 Accurate estimation of revenue from other sources is not pos-
sible due to different links and mechanisms affecting individual 
branches of revenues. IHS Markit presents that income derived from 
other sources between the second quarter of 2015 and second quar-
ter of 2017, fell by 56% from $9 million to $4 million per month.  
At the beginning of 2016 Daesh earned $3 million, while from Sep-
tember 2016, estimates have increased by $1 million and continue 
to maintain at this level (Figure 1). 
 
Money transfer methods 
 
Hawala. Terrorists from Daesh have chosen several ways to 
transfer acquired funds. Traditional methods include hawala, which 
in Arabic means the transfer or transmission42. The essence of this 
informal banking system is based on trust between the participants 
of the transaction. It is used around the world to the legal and the 
illegal money transfers. The first form applies for example to many 
foreign workers in the United States. Somalis working in Minnesota 
                                                          
40 I. Awan, Cyber-Extremism: Isis and the Power of Social Media, “Social Science and Public 
Policy”, April 2017, Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 142.  
41 M. Skalski, Uwaga! Kto finansuje ISIS? Szwedzcy podatnicy!, “Wolność24”, March 13, 
2017, http://wolnosc24.pl/2017/03/13/uwaga-kto-finansuje-isis-szwedzcy-podatnicy/ 
(access: 18.07.2017). 
42 Abu Dhabi Declaration on Hawala, May 16, 2002, https://www.centralbank.ae/ 
pdf/amlscu/Abu-Dhabi-Declaration-on-Hawala-2002.pdf (access: 18.07.2018). 
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send earned money this way to their families, due to the lack of reli-
able financial institutions in their homeland. The second refers to 
terrorists. This network is characterized by the ability to anony-
mously transfer funds across borders without the physical money 
flow through a complex process involving several hawaladar middle-
men. A high degree of secrecy prevents tracking the flow of money. 
Global hawala does not use the traditional banking system, and thus 
do not keep records, it operates without laws and regulations43. How-
ever, as pointed out by A. Shostak, Daesh moves away from this type 
of transfer in the direction of the new methods44. 
 Cryptocurrencies. This modern way of transferring funds 
helps terrorists in conducting financial transactions. Cryptocurren-
cies are digital sources of value that can be digitally traded. With 
virtual currency (eg. Bitcoin) the cost of transaction can be reduced. 
Decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies is a good source of illegally 
gained money transfers. The lack of a central administrator, which 
could monitor the transaction, affects the difficulty of law enforce-
ment in countering this type of practices. In relation to other non-
cash money transfer methods, cryptocurrencies provide much greater 
anonymity of the transaction45. Dark Wallet application prevents 
tracking Bitcoins and reach the recipient and sender of the payment. 
The first feature refers to so-called Stealth Addresses, thanks to which 
you cannot check the history of transactions associated with the  
address. The second applies to the built-in mixing structure which 
makes it impossible to check who the real sender was. It look as 
follows: user A sends Bitcoins to person B, but in reality they go to 
the user C and person B gets the coins from user D46. 
 Prepaid cards. Card charged with constant electronic value 
are another rising money transfer method. Banks offer their custom-
ers this form of service. Due to the fact that this card does not have 
to be personalized, it can be used by terrorists and criminals. Hence, 
the legal loopholes in the system of prepaid cards are a serious threat 
                                                          
43 J.R. Flores Jr., op. cit., p. 5. 
44 A. Shostak, op. cit., p. 45. 
45 Ibidem. 
46 D. Haczyk, Ruszył Dark Wallet!, „Cyfrowa Ekonomia”, May 1, 2014, 
https://cyfrowaekonomia.pl/ruszyl-dark-wallet/ (access: 19.07.2017). 
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to security. It is true that the European Union in 2016 has applied 
the amendments on prepaid cards. However, other legal differences 
in the field of international transmission of these cards may be used 
for smuggling cash. Free purchase of prepaid cards in the countries 
with weak legislation, creates the possibility of transferring the card 
abroad. The perpetrators of the attack on the Paris editorial office of 
Charlie Hebdo, had such cards in apartments. Hence, further risk 
associated with the modern method of transferring funds cannot be 
excluded47. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Diverse sources of revenue allow Daesh further functioning in 
the area of more than one state. The main earnings come from oil, 
natural gas, taxes and extortion. Furthermore, for the implementation 
of the formulated objectives it uses money from illegal practices  
related to kidnappings for ransom, human trafficking or sale of looted 
antiquities. The financial base is also provided by the foreign dona-
tions, taking over banks, currency arbitrage and funds from the mod-
ern communication networks. The use of formal financial systems by 
terrorists from Daesh, thus making the normal bank transfers, is  
associated with high risk of identifying the transaction. Hence, to  
financial transfers they used the traditional method of hawala. 
With increasing knowledge of new technologies, terrorists have 
started to look for other unconventional services which help making 
illegal practices related to the use of cryptocurrency and prepaid 
cards. 
 As it has been noted, Daesh is not a traditional terrorist  
organization. It is a different phenomenon in terms of fundraising. 
Controlled area speaks for it, and thus the perspectives of further 
multiplication of money, for example Daesh may use the areas rich 
in natural resources and take over banks. It also controls a popula-
tion, from which it can collect taxes, use extortion or take property. 
It is less dependent on foreign donations and international banking 
                                                          
47 A. Shostak, op. cit., p. 46. 
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system than the other terrorist groups. Financial problems are to a 
large extent dependent on the population and size of occupied area. 
 Actions of Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent 
Resolve started in 2014, including the air operation Tidal Wave II 
launched in October 2015 aimed at liquidation of oil drilling, refi-
neries and supply routes, had an impact on the group’s finances. 
Participation in fighting of Kurdish forces, Syrian Democratic Forces 
supported by the United States, and Syrian Arab Army supported by 
Russia also disturbed the ability of this terrorist group to finance its 
efforts to maintain influence in the region, through successive  
regaining of the occupied territories. In addition, the Iraqi Govern-
ment stopped paying remuneration to officials in the areas controlled 
by terrorists. In short, to isolate Daesh from sources of income, both 
military and political procedures were undertaken.  
 In view of the above, there are reasons to believe that Daesh 
finance will continue to decrease. Loss of large areas does not nec-
essarily mean the disintegration of Daesh, but may change their ac-
tivity. Like other groups it is able to defeat the military and financial 
problems. Al-Qaida in Iraq did not control and did not use such large 
area; it earned money from smuggling and extortion. Aversion to the 
Iraqi Government and international partners posed a threat to the 
international community. Maybe Daesh will return to such model of 
raising money increasing illicit trafficking and extortion. Disturbing 
seems the fact that a significant decrease in funds does not interfere 
with the conduct of the terrorist attacks in other parts of the world, 
in particular in Europe. Using the media facilities, published period-
icals or social networks it can affect ideologically the vulnerable pop-
ulation that will be able to make a terrorists attacks. Such activities 
are relatively cheap and can be financed by Daesh, or by the deter-
mined supporters and sympathizers of the group. 
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